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I. Historical Background
The search for a common approach to strategic stability, allowing for
a measure of arms control and disarmament for the United States and the
Soviet Union, has become the most critical issue of our time. The October
10-11, 1986, mini-summit in Reykjavik between President Reagan and
General Secretary Gorbachev focused on arms control and disarmament.
The immediate stage for accelerated arms control talks had been set at
the November 1985 Geneva summit. The significance of these two meet-
ings cannot be fully understood without looking at earlier initiatives.
Since the means designed to assure the sine qua non of national security
have been perceived differently by the two countries, the efforts to obtain
a common ground have been tortured and fraught with tension. The allies
of the superpowers have been caught up in the negotiations and have
made ongoing appraisals of their situations.
With the call by President Reagan on March 23, 1983, for a new de-
fensive strategy (a space-based, nonnuclear, strategic defense initiative
(SDI) for worldwide security), a dramatic era of arms control and disar-
mament negotiations was set in motion.' His bold proposal urged a new
doctrine with the goal of protecting mankind against nuclear harm. He
put forward a strategy based on an untested defense mechanism as op-
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posed to the existing offensive strategy of mutually assured destruction,
which had been incorporated into the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) Agreement. 2
The SDI (Star Wars), more than any other single event, has produced
concerns in the Soviet Union relating to the status of strategic stability.
In the Soviet Union the SDI has been perceived as a weapons system
giving the United States potentially a first strike capability. It was the
driving force causing the two countries to embark on their summit meet-
ings. The Soviet perception of the SDI stands in sharp contrast to that of
President Reagan. In his view the SDI would render nuclear weapons
obsolete.
At the beginning of the space age many countries took the view that
the space environment, consisting of outer space per se, the moon, and
other celestial bodies, should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. 3
When the members came to negotiate the 1967 Treaty on Principles Gov-
erning the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 4 however, they made a
distinction between the regime for outer space, per se, and the moon and
other celestial bodies. Article 4, paragraph 2, stipulated that "The Moon
and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty
exclusively for peaceful purposes." Paragraph I of article 4 contained a
limited arms control provision. This paragraph prohibited the placement
in orbit around the earth of any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other
kinds of weapons of mass destruction. It also mandated that the parties
were not to "install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such
weapons in outer space in any other manner.' 5 The 1979 Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
in article 2, paragraph 3 imposes the same constraints on the presence of
this category of weapons. 6
These two agreements allow certain military activities to take place in
the space environment, with the Moon Agreement imposing more limi-
tations than the Principles Treaty. However, neither prohibits the orbiting
of space vehicles equipped with weapons of a type other than nuclear or
mass-destruction weapons. Thus, the development and testing in 1967 and
2. 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
3. G. A. Res. 1348 (XIII), 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958).
This resolution contained the statement that outer space "should be used for peaceful
purposes only."
4. 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
5. 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
6. U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/68 (1979), 18 I.L.M. 1434 (1979). Over 85 States have ratified
the 1967 Principles Treaty. Only five have ratified the Moon Agreement, none of which are
the major space-resource countries.
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in subsequent years by the Soviet Union of anti-satellite satellites (ASATs)
in earth orbit, while evoking major concerns, did not constitute a violation
of the Principles Treaty. The ASATs did not carry nuclear or mass-de-
struction types of weapons, although it was later proven that they were
able to destroy outer space objects in low-level earth orbit. By 1976 the
Soviet activities included the destruction of targeted satellites. 7 The po-
tential use of ASATs against high-elevation United States communication
satellites, many of which serve as the nerve center for defense informa-
tion, has been viewed as a potentially major threat to the security of the
United States.
In 1978 President Carter initiated negotiations with the Soviet Union
designed to eliminate Soviet ASATs in outer space. Consultations of a
serious nature continued until the summer of 1979 when they were dis-
continued following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The Carter
administration, having completed a study of the ASAT problem, on June
20, 1978 issued a national space policy directive on June 20, 1978. It read,
in part:
The United States finds itself under increasing pressure to field an anti-satellite
capability of its own in response to Soviet activities in this area. By exercising
mutual restraint, the United States and the Soviet Union have an opportunity
at this early juncture to stop an unhealthy arms competition in space before
the competition develops a momentum of its own. 8
Following the terminated U.S.-Soviet ASAT talks of 1978-1979, Pres-
ident Carter in 1979 initiated a modest program for the development of
ASATs. 9 Even prior to that decision the U.S. Department of Defense in
1977 had paid private firms $58.7 million to determine if an ASAT could
be designed that could ram a hostile satellite.
From that time onward the Congress of the United States and the
President have been engaged in a contest respecting the desirability of
the development and testing of an American ASAT, with the President
urging such a course of action and with the Congress imposing substantial
constraints through limited appropriations and by requiring the number
of tests to be restricted. Moreover, the Congress has required that the
President certify to it that all tests were required by national security
considerations. 10 This internal dispute has not, however, prevented the
7. Christol, Arms Control and Disarmament in Space: The Rough Road to Vienna 1984-
Part 1, SPACE POL'Y, Feb. 1985, at 30.
8. White House Press Release, Description of a Presidential Directive on National Space
Policy, 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doe. 1136 (June 20, 1978); United States Space Activities,
Pun. PAPERS 1137 (1979).
9. Between 1963 and 1975, the United States had embarked on ASAT programs that had
involved some limited activities.
10. Christol, Arms Control and Disarmament in Space: The Rough Road to Vienna 1984-
Part H, SPACE POL'Y, Aug. 1985, at 265.
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development by the United States of a more efficient ASAT than that
possessed by the Soviet Union. The United States model was launched
in 1984 from a high-flying aircraft. It has been successfully tested against
an obsolete U.S. satellite occupying a higher earth orbit than the targets
destroyed by the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union took the lead in putting ASATs into outer space. The
United States responded to this security challenge and developed a more
advanced type of ASAT than that possessed by the Soviet Union. The
Soviet Union, following the break-off of the 1978-1979 ASAT negotia-
tions, began to call for restrictions on ASAT development, deployment,
and use. As the United States was approaching the deployment of a more
efficient ASAT than that possessed by the Soviet Union, the latter called
for a moratorium on ASAT development. Members of the U.S. Congress
also have urged acceptance of a moratorium on the testing of ASATs. The
Executive Department, however, sought to develop and test a U.S. ASAT
prior to the institution of a moratorium so that it might be assured that
the U.S. possessed comparable equality with the Soviet Union in this
capability. The extension of the arms race to space has been seen by both
the United States and the Soviet Union as destabilizing. The need to cope
with ASATs has undoubtedly been a major influence in their joint efforts
to find a mutually acceptable policy of arms control and disarmament.
The foregoing bilateral negotiations with their focus on ASATs has
constituted but a part of the overall arms control and disarmament debate
between the two countries. Particularly since 1981 this subject had been
under consideration at the United Nations, at the Conference of the Com-
mittee on Disarmament, and at its successor body, the Conference on
Disarmament. Since the two countries had different views as to the suit-
ability of these several international institutions as the situs for such
negotiations, this procedural matter served as a special irritant and pre-
vented optimum negotiations on substantive matters. ' I Attempts to come
to grips with substantive matters in these multinational institutions were
impeded, as they were in the bilateral negotiations, by a common pro-
pensity to engage in media diplomacy. The resulting unilateral press state-
ments and media interviews, in which strident preconditions to possible
bilateral negotiations were advanced, served to harden national demands
rather than to allow for a mutual, more private, and accommodative ex-
change of rational outlooks.
At the same time that the multilateral debates were taking plac from
1981 onward, the United States and the Soviet Union were eng- -d in
11. Christol, supra note 7, at 35-45.
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wide-ranging arms control and disarmament negotiations in Geneva. 12
These negotiations were distinct from those that focused on ASAT con-
trols. From July 1982 the United States and the Soviet Union had been
conducting strategic arms reduction talks (START) in Geneva. These talks
had been accompanied by negotiations relating to the limitation and re-
duction of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), which dated from
November 1981. On November 23, 1983, the Soviet Union declined to
participate further in the START meetings, and shortly thereafter broke
off all arms control and disarmament negotiations. This move was per-
ceived as a critically dangerous breakdown of the most vital negotiations
of our time.
Political leaders around the world began to speculate over the means
to bring the superpowers back to the conference table once again. As it
turned out, President Chernenko, despite his caretaker status, provided
the avenue for resuming arms control negotiations. 13 Following successful
ASAT tests by the United States in early June 1984, President Chernenko
on June 11, 1984, called upon the United States to join in a moratorium
on space-based weapons and tests of ASAT systems. According to the
official Tass statement, he considered that an agreement limiting ASATs
'must be sought without delay while space weapons have not yet been
deployed and while a breakthrough in the race of space weapons, unpre-
dictable in its consequences, has not yet been made." 14 This observation
produced a conciliatory response by President Reagan in his White House
news conference on June 14, 1984.
With these common positions being made a matter of record, the en-
suing events were marked by a combination of high seriousness and almost
comic behavior. On June 29, 1984, the Soviet Union issued a statement
in which it indicated that it "offers the Government of the United States
of America to begin at the level of specially appointed delegations Soviet-
American talks to prevent the militarization of outer space. The question
of the complete mutual renunciation of anti-satellite systems should be
resolved within the framework of those talks." 15 Apparently, much to the
surprise of the Soviet Union, the United States immediately and uncon-
ditionally accepted the proposal, and asked that the meeting take place
in Vienna in September 1984.
12. McNeill, U.S.-USSR Nuclear Arms Negotiations: The Process and the Lawyer, 79
AM. J. INT'L L. 52, 55 (1985).
13. General Secretary Andropov, in a meeting with United States Senators on August
18, 1983, had challenged the United States to join the Soviets in a moratorium on the presence
of ASATs in the space environment prior to a ban on them altogether. As an inducement
to such action he suggested a unilateral ban on the part of the Soviet Union. Conference
on Disarmament, U.N. Doc. CD/402, at 3 (1983).
14. L.A. Times, June 12, 1984, Part I, at 1.
15. N.Y. Times, June 30, 1984, at A4.
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The United States considered the Soviet offer to be broad enough to
include the following: (1) the resumption of negotiations on the reduction
of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, and (2) "verifiable
and effective limitations on antisatellite weapons."1 6 The United States
added that it "prepared to discuss any other arms control concerns or
other matters of interest to both sides."17
The U.S. acceptance created the occasion for charges and counter-
charges over whether the United States had put forward preconditions to
a discussion of renunciation of ASATs. The United States took the view
that it had agreed to discuss ASATs only in the event the Soviets declined
to negotiate on other aspects of arms control and disarmament. The Soviet
position, as set forth in Tass, was that: "Judging by the statement of a
highly placed administration official, it is a question first of linking the
issue of demilitarization of space with talks of medium-range missiles,
which were broken off because of the obstacles created by the U.S.
administration." 18 The Soviet Union, failing to obtain what it considered
to be a positive response from the United States, made no further effort
to participate in the proposed September meeting in Vienna.
In light of this episode it could be concluded that the road to a resolution
of the entire arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union
was so bestrewn with boulders that prospects for even a limited success
were exceedingly marginal. Yet, following a number of meetings between
high-level diplomats from the two countries, Secretary of State Shultz
and Foreign Minister Gromyko met in Geneva on January 7 and 8, 1985,
to lay the ground work for arms control and disarmament negotiations,
negotiations that the Soviets stressed were to be "completely new." 19 By
this time the initial Soviet concern over the development of an efficient
ASAT system by the United States had been replaced by the fear that the
United States would go forward with its newly identified strategic policy
of defense, the SDI.
Clearly, the Soviet Union, with its concern for national security, and
possibly with an eye on a condition of superiority over the United States
in its armaments, including defensive capabilities, was seriously troubled
by the steps being taken by the United States relating both to ASATs and
the proposed SDI. This concern led to the issuance of a joint communique
on January 8, 1985, in which the two countries announced future meetings
to consider "space and nuclear arms-both strategic and intermediate
16. Id. at col. 2-3.
17. Id. at col. 5.
18. L.A. Times, July 1, 1984, Part I, at 18.
19. L.A. Times, Nov. 23, 1984, Part I, at 34.
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range-with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrela-
tionship." 20 The parties were also in agreement that:
The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed
at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and
reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability. The negotiations
will be conducted by a delegation from each side, divided into three groups. 2'
The sides believe that ultimately the forthcoming negotiations, just as
efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete
elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.
As a result of this decision the two countries began wide-ranging ne-
gotiations in Geneva on March 11, 1985. Slow progress during 1985 was
stimulated by the November 1985 Geneva Summit. Further stimulus has
resulted from the Soviet proposal on January 15, 1986, to rid the world
of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and the favorable responses accorded
in the United States and in Europe.
On October 13, 1986, following the hastily convened mini-summit in
Reykjavik, President Reagan addressed the American people, and in fact
the entire world, in order to share his views of what had taken place. His
remarks were clear and straightforward. He focused on efforts to eliminate
ballistic missiles and the relationship of the proposed U.S. space-based,
non-nuclear SDI to that goal.
Almost from the first confusion existed over the terms of the negotia-
tions, including the finality of proposals that were discussed. Explanations
were offered almost immediately. The foreign ministers of the two coun-
tries attempted to sort out their several perceptions in Vienna beginning
on November 5, 1986. Two days later efforts at clarification were ad-
journed to Geneva, where the arms control and disarmament negotiators
of the two countries were in session. Additional public pronouncements
have come from Moscow and Washington. At stake in these historic
negotiations were two central issues, identified by Secretary of State
Shultz on October 31, 1986, as: "how to contain this continuing growth
of offensive forces; and how to reverse the gradual erosion of strategic
stability." 22
The collective efforts of the mini-summit conferees clearly testified that
the status of the SDI was a central factor in preventing the realization of
an arms control and disarmament understanding. Also at issue was the
nature of particular proposals and the extent to which agreement had been
20. N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1985, at AI0, col. 1.
21. Id.
22. U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Reykjavik: A Watershed in U.S.-Soviet
Relations, Current Policy No. 883, at 1 [hereinafter Reykjavik: A Watershed]; cf. Mandel-
baum & Talbott, Reykjavik and Beyond, 65 FOREIGN AFF. 215 (Winter 1986/1987).
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arrived at relating to the destruction of all nuclear weapons within a ten-
year frame. 23
At the close of the Reykjavik meeting no formal communique was issued
containing the terms of a final agreement respecting the SDI and the
elimination of all nuclear weapons. Describing the failure to obtain any
agreement have been such terms as deadlock, impasse, stalemate, and
standoff. Former Secretary Kissinger has characterized the mini-summit
as having produced a "melange of agreements, near-agreements, and con-
tradictory proposals." 24
Compounding the lack of clarity of the positions put forward or adopted
have been reports that President Reagan "did in fact endorse the Soviet
proposal to outlaw all strategic weapons in ten years" and that such an
agreement had not been consummated because of lack of working time
at the meeting. 25 It now seems clear that the "agreements" of Reykjavik
were all a part of the negotiating process. They dissolved with the final
failure of the meeting.
From the point of view of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the
United States having been committed by President Reagan to certain
courses of action, had "beat a retreat" from the "highground" of Reyk-
javik.26 In the period following Reykjavik charges and countercharges
flew thick and fast. Each country has attempted to persuade the world
through the media of the correctness of its perceptions and the rectitude
of its ways.
The record is far from clear as to what was "agreed to" and what was
merely proposed or discussed in Iceland. This confusion has substantially
affected any assessment of the meetings. Questions remain concerning
certain of the subjects discussed and the possibility that such matters
were raised not for final resolution but in the context of a larger bargaining
process including the sharing of general points of view.
The misunderstanding as to the scope of the disarmament proposal at
Reykjavik has carried over to the Geneva negotiations that resumed in
October. The United States has called for the liquidation of all U.S. and
Soviet ballistic missiles by 1996, for fifty percent cuts in other strategic
23. In this connection, the Administration has stated that:
The idea of destruction of all nuclear weapons was discussed but was never formally
tabled by the United States side. The President's long-term goal is to do away with all
nuclear weapons. However, many other adjustments must be made before we achieve
this goal, including reduction of conventional forces in Europe.
L.A. Times, Oct. 26, 1986, Part I, at 5, col. 1-3; see also L.A. Times, Oct. 28, 1986, Part
1, at 6, col. 1-4.
24. Kissinger, A Formula from Reykjavik: Arms Proposals Full of Peril, L.A. Times,
Nov. 16, 1986, Part V, at 1.
25. Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 29, 1986, at 3, col. 4, at 4, col. 3.
26. L.A. Times, Nov. 8, 1986, Part I, at 8, col. 1-6.
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nuclear weapons, and for removal of all intermediate range missiles from
Europe.27 In response the Soviet Union has again contended that the
United States agreed in Iceland to the elimination of "all strategic nuclear
weapons" and not just to "all ballistic missiles." This contention has
clouded the October-November bilateral negotiations in Geneva.
In the area of arms control and disarmament three major subjects, each
with subordinated details, were under review at Reykjavik: the reduction
and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons; the strategic role of the SDI,
particularly as it related to the terms of the 1972 ABM Treaty; and the
packaging or linking of specific topics. Under the heading of nuclear
weapons, the operational agenda included ballistic missiles, strategic of-
fensive forces, and intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). The discus-
sions surrounding the SDI took into account research, development, and
testing.
In retrospect the two principal negotiators clearly came away from
Iceland with vastly different impressions of much of what had taken place.
They were, however, in accord that the immediate prospect for a con-
structive outcome had been blocked by different views of the SDI. Instead
of producing the political circumstances conducive to mutually beneficial
security programs, the meeting, with its immediate sequel in Vienna and
in Geneva, enhanced a recognition of the important differences-some
would say "hostility"-between the two countries. 28 Even so, the two
heads of state have committed themselves to continue their efforts to deal
with the two central issues identified by Secretary Shultz on October 31.29
In his address of October 13, 1986, President Reagan stated that the
United States had "offered the complete elimination of all ballistic mis-
siles-Soviet and American-from the face of the Earth by 1996."30 This
goal was premised on his concern with the "mutual threat of destruction" 3 '
because of the presence of "thousands of nuclear warheads targeted on
each other and capable of wiping out both our countries." 32 The American
offer, and the underlying premise, were founded on the view that national
interests in strategic stability would be best served by the adoption of a
policy in which defense would largely replace the doctrine of mutually
assured destruction, a doctrine built on the proposition that offensive
27. L.A. Times, Oct. 30, 1986, Part I, at 7, col. 2.
28. Nye, Hostility More than Weaponry Blocks Nuclear Disarmament, L.A. Times, Nov.
8, 1986, Part V, at 3.
29. Reykjavik: A Watershed, supra note 22, at 1.
30. U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Report on Reykjavik, Current Policy
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capabilities would serve as deterrents and would optimize national
securities.
In his remarks on October 13, 1986, President Reagan also took notice
of the discussions at the 1985 Geneva Summit, and in subsequent Geneva-
based negotiations, relating to "ways to reduce and, in fact, eliminate
nuclear weapons entirely." 33 He said "We and the Soviets have had teams
of negotiators in Geneva trying to work out a mutual agreement on how
we could reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons. And so far, no success." 34
He indicated that following the expression of Soviet concern over the
SDI he had made an effort to determine how Soviet views could be
satisfied while the United States was protecting its principles and security.
Focusing on offensive weapons, he stated: "We proposed a 10-year period
in which we began with the reduction of all strategic nuclear arms, bomb-
ers, air-launched cruise missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, sub-
marine-launched ballistic missiles and the weapons they carry."'35
In this enumeration President Reagan identified the three cornerstones
of U.S. strategic policy: land-based, air-based, and sea-based security
forces. He then stated that they "would be reduced 50% in the first 5
years." 36 He followed by saying "During the next 5 years, we would
continue by eliminating all remaining offensive ballistic missiles of all
ranges." 37 Following the meeting in Reykjavik President Reagan reported
that "both sides seemed willing to find a way to reduce even to zero the
strategic ballistic missiles we have aimed at each other." 38 Secretary Shultz
confirmed this position on October 31 when he stated: "At Reykjavik, we
worked out a formula for 50% reductions in the strategic nuclear offensive
forces of both sides over a 5-year period. We agreed upon some numbers
and counting rules-that is how different types of weapons would count
against the reduced ceilings." 39 He later observed in Vienna on November
5, 1986, that the two heads of state in Reykjavik had "reached the basis
of an agreement for a first step of 50% reductions in Soviet and American
strategic nuclear forces over a 5-year period." 40 Further detail on a com-
mon outlook relating to all ranges of ballistic nuclear missiles was supplied
by Secretary Shultz on October 31. He stated:
For intermediate-range nuclear missiles--commonly known as INF-we reached
agreement on even more drastic reductions, down from a Soviet total of over
33. Id.
34. Id.




39. Reykjavik: A Watershed, supra note 22, at 1.
40. U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Pursuing the Promise of Helsinki,
Current Policy No. 892, at 2 [hereinafter Pursuing the Promise].
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1,400 to only 100 warheads on longer-range INF missiles worldwide on each
side. There would be a ceiling on shorter-range negotiations to reduce their
numbers as well. 41
This situation was similarly understood by Ambassador E. L. Rowny. He
has written that "in the area of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF),
we are very close to a mutually acceptable formula for a global limit of
100 warheads on longer-range missiles for each side." 42
President Reagan, in his statement of October 13 referring to the ten-
year target period, observed that: "And during that time, we would pro-
ceed with research, development, and testing of SDI-all done in con-
formity with ABM provisions. At the 10-year point, with all ballistic
missiles eliminated, we could proceed to deploy advanced defenses, at
the same time permitting the Soviets to do likewise." 43 Despite this outline
for the future, it was evident the Soviet Union held concerns relating to
strategic defenses. According to Secretary Shultz at Reykjavik, President
Reagan proposed that:
For 10 years, both sides confine their strategic defense programs to research,
development, and testing activities permitted by the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty. This would take place in the context of steady reductions in U.S. and
Soviet Offensive Forces and lead to the elimination of their offensive ballistic
missiles during the decade-and on the understanding that either side would
then have the right to deploy advanced defenses unless agreed otherwise. 44
The same point was made by the Secretary of State in an address in San
Francisco on October 31, 1986, when he observed that the ten-year dis-
armament process would take place "in the context of steady reductions
toward zero ballistic missiles during this period and on the understanding
that either side would have the right to deploy advanced defenses unless
the parties should agree otherwise." 45
From the language used by President Reagan and Secretary Shultz it
is reasonably clear they believed that progress had been made on an
agreement relating to offensive nuclear weapons. It was to become ap-
parent, however, that the Soviet Union would not be governed by an
understanding of the kind described above that did not take suitable ac-
count of the SDI. At Reykjavik the SDI was examined with reference to
the terms of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Two parts of the treaty came into
focus.
41. Reykjavik: A Watershed, supra note 22, at 1. For an almost identical statement, see
Pursuing the Promise, supra note 40, at 2.
42. Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 20, 1986, at 26, col. 4.
43. Report on Reykjavik, supra note 30, at 2.
44. Pursuing the Promise, supra note 40, at 2.
45. Reykjavik: A Watershed, supra note 22, at 2.
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First, the provision allowing either party to renounce the agreement
for cause with six months advance notice came under scrutiny. At Reyk-
javik the two states tentatively agreed to amend the ABM agreement so
as to provide for a ten-year notice of revocation.
The second issue concerned constraints on defensive programs during
a ten-year period. According to Paul H. Nitze, problems raised at Reyk-
javik included the "interrelationship between limitations on defense and
space programs and reductions in offensive systems." 46 These he further
identified. One issue involved the relevant time period, or date, to govern
certain obligations that the United States and the Soviet Union would
undertake regarding these problems. General Secretary Gorbachev in-
sisted on a time period of ten years. President Reagan was prepared to
agree to this time period provided agreement could be achieved on three
subjects, namely, the regime of control over defenses, the program of
reductions in offensive ballistic missiles during these ten years, and what
each side was to be allowed to do after ten years.47
The interrelationship identified by Mr. Nitze, based on the American
commitment to the SDI, led to Soviet opposition. The United States
wished to apply the ABM Treaty provisions so as to allow for SDI re-
search, development, and testing. The U.S. position has been that the
ABM Treaty permits "various types of ABM development and testing
activity." 48 One type of activity described by Mr. Nitze as "permitted by
the ABM Treaty" involves ABM systems:
based on physical principles other than the physical principles used in 1972 and
components of such systems capable of substituting for the ABM components
defined in Article II. Agreed Statement D to the ABM Treaty, which has the
same legal standing as the main text of the treaty, permits the "creation -- i.e.,
the development and testing-of, for example, space based ABM systems that
are based on "other physical principles" and their components. 49
In his view this conclusion is sustainable under an earlier restricted or
"narrower" interpretation of the Treaty as well as under the more recent
or "broader" interpretation. Hence, the United States in his view can
legally proceed with its goal of achieving "the SDI research objectives." 50
46. U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Permitted and Prohibited Activities
under the ABM Treaty, Current Policy No. 886, at 1 [hereinafter Permitted and Prohibited
Activities].
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id.
50. Id. Much has been said and written about the proper construction of the ABM Treaty
and Agreed Statement D. See Harris, Arms Control Treaties: How Do They Restrain Soviet
Strategic Defense Problems? ORBIs, Winter 1986, at 704; J. Rhinelander, "The Salt I Agree-
ments," in M. WILLRICH & J. RHINELANDER, SALT: THE MOSCOW AGREEMENT AND BE-
YOND 125 (1974); U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, The ABM Treaty and the
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In contrast, according to Secretary Shultz, "Mr. Gorbachev proposed, in
effect, to amend the ABM Treaty. He sought a prohibition on all testing
outside laboratories---except testing of the sort of ABM system the So-
viets now have around Moscow." 51
In the American view the accommodations outlined in its ten-year plan
for arms control and disarmament could be reached only with the SDI
program firmly in place. Further, achieving this goal would be facilitated
if the ABM Treaty were to allow for SDI research, testing, and devel-
opment. An effective SDI according to President Reagan is "America's
insurance policy that the Soviet Union would keep" arms control and
disarmament commitments. 52 The same position was taken by Secretary
Shultz in Vienna on November 5, 1986, where he said that the SDI was
needed as "an investment in and insurance for a more stable strategic
balance." 53 Moreover, according to President Reagan, the "SDI is the
key to a world without nuclear weapons." 54
Since the United States was not able to agree to a ten-year limitation
allowing only for laboratory research, development, and testing without
a further clarification of how these terms were to be defined and applied
to SDI activity, and where such research, development, and testing might
occur, the Soviet interpretation of the ABM Treaty was declined. As a
result, the two sides reached no final agreement on arms control and
disarmament.
Secretary Shultz has identified the reasons for a vigorous SDI program
within the limits of the ABM Treaty. In his words: "We need it to give
the Soviets an incentive to agree now to deep cuts in offensive forces and
to honor those agreements over the coming years. We need SDI to ensure
the Soviet Union's own compliance with current ABM Treaty restrictions
on defenses." 55 Despite these considerations, the Soviet Union at Reyk-
SDI Program, Current Policy No. 755 (1985); G. SMITH, DOUBLETALK: THE STORY OF THE
FIRST STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (1980); Department of Defense, Report to the
Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, June 1986; ABM Treaty Interpretation Dispute,
Hearings before the Subcomm., International Security and Science of the Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Session, (1985); see also Arms Control and Disarmament Sympo-
sium, American Society of International Law, April 1986 (to be published in 1987).
51. Reykjavik: A Watershed, supra note 22, at 2. The same conclusion was reached by
Mr. P. H. Nitze. He has said that at Reykjavik the Soviet Union sought:
To modify the ABM Treaty to confine to the laboratory research and testing on any space
elements of space-based systems. The Soviets intended to impose constraints on our SDI
research program far more severe than those imposed even by the 'narrower' interpre-
tation of the ABM Treaty. Such additional constraints would kill the SDI program.
Permitted and Prohibited Activities, supra note 46, at 2.
52. Report on Reykiavik, supra note 30, at 3.
53. Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 6, 1986, at 11, col. 1-3.
54. Report on Reykjavik, supra note 30, at 3.
55. Id. at 2.
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javik continued its opposition to the SDI. This occurred even though the
United States offered "to eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles by 1996
and by promising to confine strategic-defense activities within the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty limits for the same 10-year period." 56
Insofar as the language of President Reagan (quoted above) relates to
strategic offensive forces, the Soviet Union has elected to treat as an
agreement the terms relating to the elimination of "all nuclear weapons"
down to battlefield nuclear devices. However, subsequent efforts to es-
tablish a single consistent outlook have been unsuccessful. The United
States has taken the view that its proposal was to eliminate "all ballistic
missiles," including presumably those carrying nuclear warheads, with
future consideration to be given to the elimination of "all remaining of-
fensive ballistic missiles of all ranges," 57 e.g., all nuclear weapons, if the
appropriate strategic balance could be agreed upon. Disagreement also
surfaced as to the scheduling of the elimination of weapons within the
ten-year period. The Soviets considered this meant the reduction by fifty
percent of all of the legs of the nuclear triad. If such were to be the case
this would, of course, from the U.S. perspective, apply to the heavy
ballistic missiles possessed by the Soviet Union.
The nature of this transaction was further complicated by the specific
figure to be assigned to each of the legs of the triad. The Soviet Union
apparently has construed this to mean a fifty percent reduction in each
of the three capabilities, e.g., an across the board approach. According
to one report, the U.S. position with regard to the fifty percent reduction
is that it would, if implemented, lead to an elimination of 1,600 "delivery
vehicles" and "6,000 warheads as aggregate ceilings on the three types
of weapon carriers. Within the ceiling, the two leaders indicated that sub-
ceilings would be set in future negotiations for warhead limits on each
type of carrier."58 Ambassador Rowny has confirmed the authenticity of
this outlook. He has stated that the Soviet Union publicly agreed to a
formula reducing "to 6,000 the number of ballistic missile warheads and
long-range air-launched cruise missiles, and of heavy bombers carrying
gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles." 59
The two foreign ministers made additional efforts in Vienna to clarify
their positions on the presence of medium range ballistic missiles. The
negotiators seem to have been in accord that with respect to these weap-
ons, which were to be eliminated from Europe, the Soviet Union might
56. Christian Sci. Monitor, supra note 42, at 26, col. 3.
57. Report on Reykjavik, supra note 30, at 2.
58. L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1986, Part I, at 8, col. 4-5.
59. Christian Sci. Monitor, supra note 42, at 26, col. 4. The November 1986 Geneva
negotiations have used these figures. Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 17, 1986, at 48, col. 3.
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retain 100 for disposition in Soviet Asia, and that the same number would
be available to the United States for emplacement in the United States.
America's NATO allies have insisted that strategic stability requires a
balance between conventional and nuclear arms. This limited agreement
was, however, overshadowed by the necessity of reaching agreement on
all of the subjects under discussion, including INF verification. While in
Vienna, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze indicated that unless the SDI
issue was resolved "no solution is possible to any of the problems in the
package as it now stands, whether of strategic arms or of medium-range
missiles."6
The "package" precondition of the Soviet Union was further evidenced
at the meeting of the arms control and disarmament negotiators in Geneva
on November 7, 1986. The Soviet negotiating team tied proposals for cuts
in medium-range and strategic missiles to a virtual ban on the effective
development of the SDI. Further, at the same meeting the Soviets were
unwilling to deviate from the mandate established in January of 1985 for
the Geneva negotiations, namely, that strategic weapons, medium-range
weapons, and space weapons should be considered in their relationship.
As a result, the SDI and the removal of medium-range missiles from
Europe had become a part of the entire package. 61 In addition, earlier
efforts to trade reductions or possible eliminations of medium-range bal-
listic missiles for ASATs were no longer separable from the larger package.
The sessions in Vienna became the hostage to both procedural and
substantive hazards. Each state favored an agenda of its own making.
The United States put forward a statement intended as the basis for further
negotiations. The Soviets tabled a three-page summary of their version
of the Reykjavik sessions on a "take-it-or-leave-it basis." 62 Reportedly,
this approach failed because the second paragraph of the Soviet paper
stated that the two heads of state had "agreed only to eliminate all of-
fensive ballistic missiles within 10 years." 63 Thus, the contest, which had
smoldered since Reykjavik whether the United States had agreed to elim-
inate "all ballistic missiles" as well as all offensive nuclear weapons,
including those carried by bombers, cruise missiles, and those launched
from submarines, while the SDI issue remained unresolved, was resur-
rected. Further, the meeting in Vienna was not able to ameliorate the
Soviet view that the involvement of the United States in the SDI must
be restricted to laboratory research. The Soviet focus on this subject led
Secretary Shultz to say in Vienna that: "It seemed to us that they have
60. L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1986, Part I, at 8, col. 3.
61. L.A. Times, Nov. 8, 1986, Part I, at 8, col. 1.
62. L.A. Times, Nov. 7, 1986, Part I, at 21, col. 1.
63. Id.
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the objective of crippling the President's effort to find out how we can
defend ourselves against ballistic missiles. If that is their objective, it is
not going to work." 64
At Vienna the United States suggested progress could be made by
narrowing the difference between the position taken in Reykjavik re-
specting long-range strategic nuclear forces, namely that there could be
1,600 strategic nuclear launchers with no more than 6,000 warheads. The
United States proposed that each side be allowed to have no more than
1,650 of those warheads on the so-called heavy missiles with more than
six warheads. 6 5 However, the Soviet focus on a package deal prevented
consideration of this U.S. proposal.
At present, the Geneva negotiations must deal with the SDI proposal,
with strategic offensive forces, with intermediate-range forces, and ac-
cording to the original agenda, with antisatellite satellites as one form of
space weapons. In mid-November 1986 the Soviet Union also linked nu-
clear testing with the listed subjects. 66 To complicate matters, members
of NATO, including in particular the United Kingdom, as well as American
critics, both outside and within the Reagan Administration, have ex-
pressed second thoughts about the elimination of all nuclear ballistic mis-
siles. Thus, according to Kenneth Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, while the offer to scrap such weapons
remains "on the table, in the overall scheme of things, it [was] not being
emphasized as much as before. .".."67 He also said on November 17,
1986, that "the offer to eliminate missiles was 'not operational' any longer
and that it was 'more reasonable' to 'de-emphasize' the radical goal of
total elimination in 10 years while working toward the more limited target
of a 50%, five-year cut in all strategic weapons." 68 Support for the last
mentioned approach has come from NATO's foreign and defense minis-
ters. In a communique issued on December 12, 1986, they stated that they
"welcome the progress at Reykjavik towards agreement on 50% reduc-
tions in U.S. and Soviet strategic forces." 69
Another aspect of the current arms control and reduction debate de-
serves mention. President Reagan, by ordering the deployment on No-
vember 28, 1986, of the 131st B-52 bomber equipped with cruise missiles,
exceeded the limits on multi-warhead weapons systems contained in the
unratified 1979 ABM agreement. The grounds for the decision were that
64. Id. at col. 2.
65. Id. at col. 3.
66. Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 17, 1986, at 48, col. 4.
67. Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 20, 1986, at 2.
68. L.A. Times, Nov. 21, 1986, Part I, at 17, col. 6.
69. L.A. Times, Dec. 13, 1986, Part I, at 1, col. 4.
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the Soviet Union was not in compliance with that agreement. Prior to its
decision, however, the United States had indicated that it would continue
to adhere to the agreement for ten years if it were assured that the Soviet
Union would not oppose the development of a space-based SDI at the
end of that ten-year period. Since the two countries were in disagreement
on the future of the space-based SDI, the U.S. action resulted. The im-
mediate response of the Soviet Union was that the addition of one B-52
bomber to the American defense system would not materially influence
the Soviet security system. At the political level, however, the Soviet
foreign ministry indicated that the U.S. action would "inevitably influence
most negatively the atmosphere in which Soviet-American contacts take
place in the context of arms reduction." 70 General Secretary Gorbachev
has characterized it as a "major mistake which will make it more difficult
to search for the approaches for disarmament." 7 1
Efforts have been made to understand and clarify the role of the SDI
in the overall search for strategic stability. Aside from the fact that the
SDI proposal has been of critical importance in bringing the two states
to the arms control and disarmament conference table, the proposal, as
part of the package, impacts on the condition of national security. The
United States has given notice of the continuance of its present SDI
research. President Reagan indicated that "if and when we reached the
stage of testing, we would sign now a treaty that would permit Soviet
observation of such tests. And if the program was practical, we would
both eliminate our offensive missiles, and then we would share the benefits
of advanced defenses." 72 He has called for a ten-year period of research
and development, as well as the testing of space defenses. According to
this view, nothing would be prohibited short of deployment.
The Soviet Union, having incorporated the SDI in its negotiational
package, might be expected to maintain an open mind as to the practical
utility of such a device, since it has engaged in its own SDI research.
Thus, it cannot logically or consistently oppose the concept of the SDI,
but could limit the concept to laboratory research, presumably only in
laboratories located on the earth. It appears that the Soviet Union also
would be willing for testing to take place, but only within such labora-
tories. Further, the Soviets oppose the testing of SDI components outside
of laboratories.
The SDI proposal and the 1972 ABM Agreement are closely interre-
lated. The United States proposed that the ABM agreement should be
applied to SDI research, development, and testing of space defenses, and
70. L.A. Times, Nov. 28, 1986, Part I, at 24, col. 1.
71. L.A. Times, Nov. 29, 1986, Part I, at 20, col. 5.
72. Report on Reykjavik supra note 30, at 2.
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thereafter "either side would then have the right to deploy advanced
defenses unless agreed otherwise." 73 The Soviet response, which was
based on its concern about the ultimate utility of the space-based SDI,
sought to restrict SDI enhancement to laboratory research for a period
of ten years during which nuclear weapons would be reduced and finally
eliminated. During the same period, the 1972 ABM Treaty was to be
observed, including those provisions prohibiting the building of missile
defenses. Mr. Shevardnadze expressed opposition to the prospect of the
future legalization of advanced space-based defenses. He was critical of
such an outcome saying, "We were invited to endorse the deployment of
space weapons and sign the treaty's death sentence, postponing its exe-
cution for 10 years." 74
In retrospect it seems that the October-November negotiations between
the United States and the Soviet Union, despite their sound basic objec-
tives, offered proof that the two countries are not yet ready for strategic
and tactical decisions. Their basic differences were enhanced by uncer-
tainty whether arms control and disarmament measures of the kind under
review would produce a greater or a lesser amount of national security.
From these sessions, as well as the preceding Geneva bilateral negotia-
tions, the negotiators should have realized that neither side would profit
from adding to their already overflowing arsenals of offensive nuclear
weaponry. Nevertheless, both sides were disposed to continue to mod-
ernize existing types of operational arms, ammunition, and implements of
war. During the negotiations the Soviet Union was able to challenge the
policies of the United States relating to a space-based SDI while charac-
terizing it as a destabilizing influence. Consequently, the Soviet Union op-
posed any activity going beyond earth-based laboratory research. While
seeking to deny to the United States the benefits possibly derivable from
this instrumentality, with its focus on defensive rather than offensive doc-
trine, the Soviet Union nonetheless continued to rely upon and to expand
its land-based defensive capabilities. These are located around Moscow
and are being built at Krasnoyarsk. Further, in its efforts to achieve mil-
itary security, the Soviet Union has been heavily engaged in a space-based
missile defense system, including a very large laser program. 75
Although the Soviet Union has publicly proclaimed a status quo military
doctrine, based on the doctrine of deterrence through offensive capabilities,
it has also quietly extended its defensive strengths. The United States has in-
dicated the need to go beyond research activities relating to a space-based
73. L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1986, Part I, at 8, col. 6.
74. Id. at col. 5-6.
75. These conclusions have been recently attributed to Bernard Blake L.A. Times, Nov.
25, 1986, Part I, at 2, col. 1.
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SDI. Thus, strategic stability, from the American perspective, if it is to be
achieved, will result from the perfection of new and more scientifically ad-
vanced space-based defensive weapons than are presently generally available.
Since the advent of an operational space-based SDI is some years into
the future, the superpowers presently have an opportunity to negotiate re-
straints on the quality and quantity of existing weapons, including ABM
launching capabilities, as well as the physical location of such weapons.
Thus, the possibility exists that constructive steps are still available in the
areas of arms control and disarmament. In ultimate terms in their respec-
tive searches for strategic stability, the United States can be expected to
continue its inquiry into the practicality of a space-based SDI while the
Soviet Union will prefer the combined offensive and defensive doctrines
from which it profited following the entry into force of the 1972 ABM Treaty.
The issues presented are of the first order of magnitude and must be
resolved. The strategy of the Soviet Union probably will be to avoid high
summits for an extended period. Nonetheless, the two sides have a joint
commitment to continue the Geneva agenda. Strong political campaigns
orchestrated by both states in Europe and in the Americas can be antic-
ipated. Since identifying the practicality of the U.S. SDI undertaking will
take time, the Soviet Union in all likelihood will follow a media strategy
of seeking to obtain a reconsideration of this policy in the United States.
As a result, the United States can be expected to continue to maintain
its offensive capabilities until it is abundantly clear that it possesses a
strong and viable defensive capability.
The ongoing disapproval by the Soviet Union of the U.S. plan to go
forward with the research, development, and testing of a space-based,
non-nuclear SDI should not be construed as negating all of the other efforts
to arrive at arms control and disarmament agreements. The 1986 mini-
summit should not be perceived only on the basis of failed proposals. At
Reykjavik, and subsequently, preliminary understandings were reached.
The willingness to submit proposals to the negotiating process has not
been meaningless. Only through joint efforts is it possible to look toward
accommodations containing a higher degree of clarity and specificity re-
specting SDI research, development, and testing, including the places
where such activities would be permissible. Seen as a step in a long
negotiating process, the 1986 mini-summit put the respective differences,
motivations, and policies of the two States in a clearer light.
II. Arms Control and International Law
in the Modern State System
All humankind has an interest and involvement in the existence of a
world rule of law and of institutions designed to secure the effective
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implementation of international law. This interest and involvement stems
in no small part from the fact that human beings in an increasingly nuclear
world-human beings who have evolved over eons of time to become the
highest form of animal life-are aware that they may, in fact, be not only
a threatened but indeed a rare and endangered species. The danger and
challenge have been captured in the words of Perez de Cuellar, U.N.
Secretary-General. He said in 1985, "We face today a world of almost
infinite promise which is also a world of potentially terminal danger. The
choice between these alternatives is ours." 76
In light of these considerations the two meetings, following almost a
decade of enlarging tensions, constituted a recognition of the gravity of
the bipolar relationship. The most critical issues considered by the two
leaders in 1985 and 1986 remained unresolved. Nonetheless, the final
communique identified a number of areas in which future negotiations
were to be pursued. Both countries were clearly aware of the critical need
to pursue with vigor over a very extended period of time the search for
the conditions that would allow relatively harmonious and assured se-
curity relationships to exist. The tensions involved in the search for stra-
tegic stability are so full of danger that no avenue for their reduction
should go unnoticed.
As humankind is preparing to move into the twenty-first century, it is
conditioned, or as some would say, constrained in the management of its
common problems by the nation-state system. Fundamental to this system
is the principle of legal coequality premised on the concept of national
sovereignty. It is within this system that the instrumentalities of law and
politics can work their way toward the formation of suitable relationships
between the superpowers.
Foremost of the immediate values to be served by national sovereignty
is the condition of national security. National survival is the ultimate value.
National security results from the blending of a number of forces and
influences. The manner of the admixture of highly diverse capabilities
will contribute to, and perhaps assure, the condition of security. An ac-
ceptable product resulting from a myriad of possible combinations is a
political work of art. Properly conceived and implemented, the work of
skilled and inspired artisans can contribute not only to national security
but also to the condition of bipolar strategic stability.
In order for a state to obtain the requisite level of national security, the
security planner-who must be well versed in the complexity of both
politics and the law-must be aware of available resources, and must be
committed to the wise and sparing use of such resources. National security
76. U.N. Doc. A/40/1, DPI Publication 852 (1985).
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will depend on access to critical natural resources, the size and quality
of the population, including its level of education and enterprise, the
stature of its leaders, the industrial base, the qualitative effectiveness of
its system of government, an awareness in a free society of the importance
of democratic traditions, a recognition of the need for the equitable dis-
tribution among its population of the benefits derived from the overall
social-political-economic complex, the effectiveness of its information
gathering capabilities, and the quality and versatility of its armaments and
those skilled in their use. The foregoing conditions, plus the appropriate
blend of armaments, coupled with the political judgment and military skill
used in their deployment, grounded on a common and enduring commit-
ment to community interests and values, can form a basis for national
security. Any sense of national security, however, must be weighed against
and depend on the strengths of a possible adversary, or combination of
adversaries, real or imagined, either when acting alone or in concert with
others.
III. The Search for Strategic Stability
in a Dangerously Asymmetrical World
The peoples and nations of this world share an enormous number of
interests, values, wants, and needs. Unfortunately, it does not follow that
at present there are strong similarities in a variety of important areas
among the United States and the Soviet Union. In assessing the fact of
their asymmetries, one can only wonder whether the major differences
between those two states have already imposed excessive limits upon
their respective capacities to arrive in the future at the important condition
of strategic stability.
Strategic stability between the superpowers is heavily influenced by the
organization of the world into states and the resulting emphasis on na-
tionalism. A current assessment of the impact of nationalism reads as
follows:
Nationalism has to its credit far-reaching cultural and even practical achieve-
ments, but for two centuries now it has found its characteristic expression in
imperialism, aggrandizement, and war, in racism, in the exploitation of "back-
ward" people by the strong, and in the cultivation of ideologies rooted in
parochialism and justified by moral arrogance. 77
It is doubtful that it is correct to characterize a serious and abiding com-
mitment to the principles of a free democracy as "moral arrogance." Yet,
the application of both nationalism and science and technology to the
77. Commager, Science, Nationalism, and the Academy, 71 ACADEME, Nov.-Dec. 1985,
at 9.
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search for national security undoubtedly contributes in many critical ways
to a dangerously asymmetrical world.
It has been suggested that the Soviet commitment to a policy of co-
existence, with its emphasis on nationalism, imposes restrictions on pros-
pects among states toward a wider interdependence. Samuel P. Hunting-
ton poses the question in this way: "At what point does interdependence
become incompatible with coexistence? ' '7 8 At present the contest be-
tween coexistence and interdependence clearly has prevented the emer-
gence of a satisfactory condition of strategic stability. Many differences
have contributed to this situation. In general, the United States and the
Soviet Union have different outlooks as to societal structures and as to
many important values and interests. These differences of outlook have
been conditioned by different histories.
Ideological differences are of paramount importance. The Soviet Union,
perhaps more than any other country, relies on a philosophical framework
both to guide and to justify its actions. Statism, with its concentration of
political authority in the hands of the few, is a Soviet hallmark. By con-
trast, diffusion of authority is central to democratically oriented states.
In the Soviet Union authority is imposed from the top. In the free world
the people are regarded as sovereign, and political power flows from the
bottom up. Illustrative of this condition is the opposing position taken
respecting the enhancement of human rights. In the Soviet Union focus
is given to human "needs," consisting of such things as food, clothing,
shelter, jobs, education, and medical services. In the United States, while
suitable attention is accorded to the foregoing, great stress is also accorded
to civil and political rights and liberties as reflected in the Bill of Rights
in the national Constitution.
Important cultural differences exist, with the Soviet society being more
immune to external influences than in the United States. Cultural isolation
can be the product of many influences, one being the imposition of con-
straints on the dissemination of foreign ideas. The Soviet practice of
jamming foreign radio broadcasts is well known. Even the interview con-
ducted by Soviet journalists, who were public representatives of the So-
viet Union, with President Reagan shortly before the 1985 Summit was
not printed in its entirety in the Soviet press.
Cultural differences can be enhanced through the tradition of language.
Here, again, there are wide-ranging differences between the meanings
conveyed by the languages of the two countries. Thus, for us the term
"negotiate" is taken to mean to arrange for, treat with, or prepare for an
78. Huntington, Will More Countries Become Democratic?, CENTER MAG., Mar.-Apr.
1985, at 3, 4.
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agreement or a transaction. The equivalent Russian word is "peregover,"
which can be read to mean "to repeat talk." The connotation of the latter
term is that nothing of substance need come from a continuing dialogue.
In English the term "compromise" is understood as an implicit aspect of
the bargaining process leading to an accommodation of differing per-
spectives. The Russian equivalent, "kompromess," carries with it the
implication of a concession of a principle. The thought that reciprocal
necessities may require the striking of a bargain, which does not, or may
not, contain the entire outlook of a given proponent, does not fit within
the context of "kompromess."
Unfortunately these language and cultural differences are not mere
idiosyncrasies. They affect all aspects of the interrelationships of these
two countries. They inhibit, and perhaps even engulf, the identification
and realization of common perspectives. In another, and more technical
sense, the proper choice of words is of critical importance, particularly
with regard to formal international agreements. Experience has taught the
need for great care in the selection of proper terms. To this end, a detailed
negotiating record must be established so that each word and the nuance
of each term will be thoroughly established prior to the acceptance of any
written undertaking. Even then, disputes will arise concerning the mean-
ing to be accorded treaty provisions. 79 The inexactitude of words has
been reflected in the observation that whenever one wishes to express an
idea more complicated than "let's have lunch," plain English is just not
precise enough. On the other hand, as Mark Twain once observed: "The
more you explain it the more I don't understand it." Nonetheless, language
differences need not constitute a necessary barrier to written commit-
ments designed to formalize the meaning of the condition of strategic
stability.
Economic differences also separate the two countries. On the one hand,
is a demonstrable adherence in the United States to the free enterprise
system. On the other, in the Soviet Union, is a highly integrated and state-
managed economic and social system. Each, with considerably varying
degrees of success, as measured by productivity and the general material
well-being of its proponent, underscores a wholly different national outlook.
Strategic approaches to national security also constitute major, and for
the time being at least, divisive differences. The outlook toward nuclear
weaponry, as formalized in the October 3, 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty (ABM), 80 was constructed on the proposition that if both countries
79. Articles 31-33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties provide guidance
in the interpretation of international agreements. 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
80. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Oct. 3, 1972, United States-Soviet Union, 23 U.S.T.
3435; T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
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were to possess enough nuclear weapons, neither would use them against
the other. This approach, which accepted the proposition that deterrence
would result from each having offensive weapons, was opened for recon-
sideration on March 23, 1983, when President Reagan offered the possi-
bility of a new strategy, namely a ballistic missile defense system.
The SDI alternative has raised the fundamental issue of national mo-
tivation. Although the U.S. administration describes SDI as a defensive
system, the Soviet Union perceives it as designed for offensive attack.
The Soviets, persuaded at this time that SDI is truly offensive in nature,
see no reason to accept President Reagan's assurance that if the system
were perfected it would be made available to the Soviet Union, presum-
ably on a cost basis, in order that both countries would be able to employ
it for defensive purposes. Uncertainty exists as to what part or parts
would be turned over, and when a strategy of defense would replace that
of offense. This uncertainty will remain pending a clarification of whether
an exchange of research components would take place or whether the
turnover would include a tested device. Influencing such an outcome, as
was demonstrated at the October 1986 mini-summit in Iceland, will be
the presence of common views relating to the nature and place of "re-
search" and "testing."
Augmenting Soviet concerns have been the unvarying American refer-
ences to its proceeding with the SDI only on a research basis. Fine lines
can be drawn between research, which is permissible under the 1972 ABM
Treaty, and certain aspects of development, testing, deployment, and use,
which are not. Because of the basic distrust, which was reflected in Geneva
in 1985 and in Reykjavik in 1986, and because of the awareness of the Soviet
Union that a future American President would not necessarily take the same
positions as those taken by Mr. Reagan, and because of concerns as to the
operative meaning which might be accorded to the terms "development,
testing, deployment, and use," the Soviet Union has made major efforts
to dissuade the United States from going forward with the SDI. It has also,
to this end, endeavored to separate the United States from its NATO allies.
The 1986 mini-summit demonstrated the need for the most careful clarifi-
cation of such terms as well as the absolute requirement that missiles,
ASATs, and conventional weapons be jointly analyzed.
Aside from different capabilities and outlooks respecting conventional
weapons, ballistic missiles, and the weaponization of space, the latter
either by way of an SDI component equipped with laser and particle beam
weaponry, or by way of anti-satellite satellites (ASATs) now in different
stages of technical development,8 ' other weapons and military compo-
81. For a comprehensive assessment of ASATs, see SPACE WEAPONS-THE ARMS CON-
TROL DILEMMA (Jasani ed. 1984).
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nents need to be considered in endeavoring to achieve the favored con-
dition of strategic stability. To be taken into very careful account, as
previously suggested, must be the respective armies, navies, and air forces
of the two states, and their scientific, technical, and industrial bases, as
well as the composition and quality of their respective allies and friends.
In assessing the strategic outlook of the two countries, the record of
historic responses to threats, real or imagined, must also be weighed.
Soviet sensitivity respecting the security of its borders can be demon-
strated through a brief review of Soviet conduct. The fate accorded to
the commercial flight of Korean Airlines 007 on September 1, 1983, was
hardly unique, with numerous comparable responses having been ac-
corded to foreign civil and military aircraft that had inadvertently intruded
into Soviet sovereign airspace, or had approached but had not strayed
into it. This practice, in effect, of "shooting first and asking questions
afterward," violates both the letter and the spirit of the 1944 Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation, and in particular those pro-
visions establishing the "rules of the road" regarding procedures to be
employed when foreign aircraft appear to be off course. The Soviet Union
is a party to this agreement. 82
The wholly dissimilar strategic outlooks and force capabilities of the
superpowers are designed to confront possible challenges to their national
security. The Soviet Union as a continental empire finds it necessary to
be attentive to the presence of the People's Republic of China along
hundreds of miles of a common border. At the same time the Soviet Union
fears the United States and its European allies. For the time being, the
identification of the proper mix of strategic forces, as well as the tactical
components of such forces, for both the United States and the Soviet
Union, is a subject of enormous complexity. Perhaps such a mix is not
well adapted to a final resolution.
The political relationships between these two states are as complex and
ill-defined as the problem of strategic stability. Broadly speaking, the
foreign policies of the Soviet Union have been based on affirmative efforts
to destabilize the alliances of the Western countries and to encourage
internal unrest in many countries under the aegis of aiding oppressed
peoples in their drive toward self-determination. In the opinion of many,
socialism is a transnational phenomenon and, as such, must be expan-
sionist if it is to survive. In their revolutionary zeal the Soviets have
initiated destabilizing procedures, known as "active measures," involving
forgery, disinformation, and political operations. 83 By comparison the
82. International Civil Aviation Convention, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No.
1591, 15U.N.T.S. 295, 3 Bevans 944.
83. The U.S. Department of State provides periodic data on the nature and scope of
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United States, as a "have" or "status quo" country, has generally pursued
a passive or, on occasion, a reactive policy. With the Soviet war against
Afghanistan and with substantial Soviet economic and military support
for Cuba, the United States has considered it prudent to react against
Soviet and Cuban influence in the Western Hemisphere, as in the instances
of Grenada, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.
The willingness of the Soviet Union to embark on foreign adventures,
including the use of force, has led to coercive countermeasures induced
by America's prudent concern for hemispheric security. Regrettably, these
common and proliferating Soviet military initiatives, followed inevitably
by defensive responses, have had a harmful effect on general community
needs. Such needs are reflected in international legal principles and rules
calling for the resolution of disputes by peaceful means. The newly epi-
demic reliance on forceful self-help has currently weakened the delicate
fiber and fabric of international law.
Among the other relevant asymmetries are those relating to the for-
mation and influence of public opinion. Further, the Soviet Union appears
to feel the need to augment its scientific and technical base through re-
liance on industrial and scientific espionage in foreign countries.
IV. The Presence of Common and Particular
Interests in Soviet-American Relations
Despite the critical and almost overwhelming differences between the
United States and the Soviet Union, they do share some common and
particular interests between themselves and with the rest of the world.
Each country by its words and actions clearly considers itself entitled to
participate in the world constitutive process, namely, to share in the
formation of world policies and to convert such policies into legally ori-
ented institutions having the force of a politically organized society behind
them. Both states will assert their mutual entitlement to access to and
participation in the decisional processes inherent in developing and op-
erating international institutions. They will demand to be heard respecting
the formation of legal principles and rules agreeable to them. They will
engage in the formation of such international legal regimes as will dis-
tribute benefits pursuant to commonly arrived at formulas. Such benefits,
should they be forthcoming, would result from a common interest in the
presence of a formal or even informal statement or identification of agree-
able law.
these destabilizing endeavors. See Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations, Special
Report No. 88, Bureau of Public Affairs, Oct. 1981; Soviet Active Measures: An Update,
Special Report No. 101, Bureau of Public Affairs, July 1982; Soviet Active Measures, Special
Report No. 110, Bureau of Public Affairs, Sept. 1983.
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An existing principle that has commanded the support of the super-
powers, as well as the approval of over eighty other states, requires that
the space environment, consisting of outer space per se, the moon, and
other celestial bodies, as well as the natural resources of these areas,
shall be free for exploration, exploitation, and use by all states equally
and without discrimination of any kind. Moreover, the moon and other
celestial bodies, including their natural resources, are to be freely acces-
sible to all states. 84
The superpowers have also, with the very considerable support of the
newer and weaker states, accepted formulas calling for the distribution
of benefits resulting from the exploitation of the common resources of the
outer space environment and of the ocean on an equitable basis. For
example, in the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the United States and Soviet Union
accepted the provisions of article 11.7.(d). That article stipulated that one
of the main purposes of a future moon and celestial body regime was to
assure "an equitable sharing of all States Parties in the benefits derived
from those resources, whereby the interests and needs of the developing
countries, as well as the efforts of those countries which have contributed
either directly or indirectly to the exploration of the Moon, shall be given
special consideration." 85
The 1973 Telecommunication Convention and Final Protocol of the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) made reference to radio
broadcasts from outer space and to the use by satellites of orbital posi-
tions. 86 Article 33 of the 1973 Convention stated that the orbit/spectrum
resource "must be used efficiently and economically so that countries or
groups of countries may have equitable access to both in conformity with
the provisions of the Radio Regulations according to their needs and the
technical facilities at their disposal." 87 At the 1982 Plenipotentiary Con-
ference of the ITU, article 33 of the Convention was revised. The 1972
phrase "according to their needs and the technical facilities at their dis-
84. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Oct. 10, 1967, United
States-Soviet Union, art. 1, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205;
C. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 38-45 (1982).
85. U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/68 (1979) 18 I.L.M. 1434 (1979). Neither the United States nor
the Soviet Union have ratified this agreement. This situation does not constitute their dis-
avowal of the provision relating to equitable sharing nor their common interests in the well-
being of developing countries.
86. Satellites when in a geostationary orbital position at 22,300 miles above the earth
travel at the same speed as the earth and provide the occasion for reliable space-to-earth
broadcasts.
87. International Telecommunication Convention, Malaga-Torremolinos, Oct. 25, 1973,
28 U.S.T. 2495, 2529, T.I.A.S. No. 8572.
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posal" was replaced by the expression "taking into account the special
needs of the developing countries and the geographical situation of par-
ticular countries." 88
The November 6, 1982, version of article 33 of the ITU Convention
resulted from the efforts of the non-space-resource states, including many
of the less-developed countries, to obtain and maintain preferential rights
to orbital positions and broadcast frequencies. Since the orbit/spectrum
resource is of enormous value, and since the resource is a limited one,
an important political contest is now being waged over it. The issue of
whether a state can possess sovereignty over the area and the resources
has been resolved. Both fall within the international legal principle of res
communis: no state can exercise exclusive authority respecting these
natural resources. Both the United States and the Soviet Union subscribe
to this principle.
The current contest poses the question whether the space-resource
states will be required to provide equitable access for non-space-resource
states to the orbit/spectrum resource. This issue was the thrust of a res-
olution of the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC), an
operating entity of the ITU. In WARC Resolution BP it was resolved that
a future WARC was to be convened "to guarantee in practice for all
countries equitable access to the geostationary-satellite orbit and the fre-
quency bands allocated to space services." 89
Although WARC resolutions carry no legal force, they do identify the
future expectations of the members of the ITU. The 1985/1987 WARC on
the Use of the Geostationary-Satellite Orbit and Planning of Space Ser-
vices Using It is engaged in examining the claims of the non-space-re-
source states for guaranteed equitable access to the orbit/spectrum re-
source. Presently it remains to be seen if the delicately balanced formula
for sharing the orbit/spectrum resource contained in the 1973 ITU Con-
vention can withstand the sharing processes called for in 1979 and 1982.
Although the thesis of "equitable access" is common to all of the
agreements and proposals, the meaning to be accorded to such access
has been clouded by the introduction of preferential terms for the less-
developed countries in article 33 of the 1982 ITU Convention. 90 Through-
out the orbit/spectrum negotiations, the United States and the Soviet
Union have been supportive of a policy of free and equal access to the
88. International Telecommunication Convention, Nairobi, Nov. 6, 1982, International
Telecommunication Union, 1982.
89. Radio Regulations, Dec. 6, 1979, Appendices and Final Protocol, International Te-
lecommunication Union, 1979.
90. Christol, Prospects for an International Legal Regime for Direct Television Broad-
casting, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 150 (1985).
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exploration, exploitation, and use of the indicated resources. From their
perspectives, world community values will be advanced through accep-
tance of the principle of equitable access.
The United States and the Soviet Union have joined together in giving
their support to the development of direct television broadcasting (DTB)
on an equitable basis. Following extended negotiations relating to the
conditions under which DTB might take place, the Legal Subcommittee
of the United Nation's Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space
(COPUOS) in 1981 was able to provide an incomplete draft declaration
of Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites
for Direct Television Broadcasting. 9 1 The preamble confirmed the im-
portance of safeguarding the "legitimate rights and interests of all States
and to encourage orderly development on an equitable basis" of DTB. 92
When in 1981 and in 1982 several of the members of COPUOS, including
the United States, objected to the inclusion in the proposed principles of
one that would have required the preliminary consent of a prospective
receiving state to a foreign direct broadcast to its population, proponents
of the principles were able to put the matter on the agenda of the UN
General Assembly.93 On December 10, 1982, the General Assembly adopted
Resolution 37/92 entitled "Principles Governing the Use by States of
Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcast-
ing." 94 As adopted, the resolution did not refer to the development of
direct television broadcasting "on an equitable basis." The resolution also
made no reference to the need for a potential broadcaster to obtain the
prior consent of the foreign country where the broadcasts might be received.
The policy of the United States was summarized by the U.S. repre-
sentative at the 1985 session of the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS.
The U.S. representative stated that the United States was "committed
to equitable access by all States" to geostationary orbital positions. 95 The
United States also proclaimed that it was a strong supporter of the need
to satisfy "the real requirements of the developing countries" for the use
of geostationary orbital positions, as well as their use of outer space
telecommunications generally. 96
91. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/288, Annex II, at 3 (1981).
92. Id.
93. COPUOS operates in arriving at its decisions on the basis of consensus, i.e., a decision
can only be taken where no objection is made to a proposal. Because of the U.S. objections
in COPUOS, the matter was taken directly to the General Assembly, thereby subverting a
practice that had served constructively in the formation of international space law.
94. U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/92 (1983), 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 733 (1983).
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The Soviet Union also has favored giving assurances to the less-
developed countries that they might have equitable access to the orbit/
spectrum resource. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have
been engaged in trying to bring this condition about through ongoing ITU-
based negotiations. The two countries are in profound disagreement, how-
ever, respecting the specific issue of obtaining the prior consent of a
receiving state before DTB can be directed toward that state from a foreign
broadcaster. 97
The United States and the Soviet Union have also joined to assure that
principles of equity must be taken into account in determining the com-
pensation to be paid by a state launching a space object, if it were to
incur liability to pay damages pursuant to article 12 of the March 29, 1972,
International Liability for Damages Caused by Space Objects Conven-
tion.98 These illustrations indicate that these two countries are in agree-
ment concerning the relevance of principles of equity in the modern in-
ternational law of outer space.
The principle of equity has also received the support of the two su-
perpowers in several of the articles of the 1982 Law of the Sea Con-
vention. 99 For example, article 69, paragraph 1 provides that:
Land-locked States shall have the right to participate, on an equitable basis, in
the exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of
the exclusive economic zones of coastal States of the same subregion or region,
taking into account the relevant economic and geographical circumstances of
all the States concerned in conformity with the provisions of this article and
of articles 61 and 62.100
The same international agreement in article 140, paragraph 1, referring
to the area in which manganese nodules might be exploited, provided that
activities in the area were to be carried about for the benefit of mankind
as a whole. Paragraph 2, created under article 156, accorded to the In-
ternational Ocean Authority the power to "provide for the equitable shar-
ing of financial and other economic benefits derived from activities in the
97. However, in 1986 the United States and the Soviet Union were able to overcome
opposing outlooks and to support COPUOS-sponsored Principles on Remote Sensing. The
Principles authorize States, non-governmental entities, and international organizations to
engage in remote sensing activities. The central theme of the agreed principles is international
cooperation rather than unlimited national privacy. This approach was dramatically different
from the national sovereignty-oriented approach taken in earlier drafts. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/
370 (1986).
98. 24 U.S.T. 2389, 2397, T.I.A.S. No. 7762; see also Christol, International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 346 (1980).
99. Draft Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/121 (1982), 21 I.L.M. 1245 (1982); U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Dec. 10, 1982 (1983).
100. U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 62/121, at 29. Article 61 dealt with the conservation of living
resources. Article 62 was entitled Utilization of the living resources.
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Area through any appropriate mechanism, on a non-discriminatory basis,
in accordance with Article 160, paragraph 2(f)(i)."'' 1 Article 160, para-
graph 2(f)(i), dealing with the administration of the resources of the area,
provided for the "equitable sharing of financial and other economic ben-
efits derived from activities in the Area." 0 2
These illustrations, drawn from modem international ocean and space
law, support the view that common outlooks can be developed respecting
the orderly sharing of the world's natural resources. The question remains
whether cooperative perspectives can be assured in other areas of com-
mon concern.
V. U.S.-Soviet Approaches to Arms
Control and Disarmament
The United States and the Soviet Union, while trying to find areas in
which they possess common interests, have been subject, knowingly or
unknowingly, to certain overarching societal influences. They have been
swept along by enormous tides having complex socioeconomic political
influences not entirely of their own making. They are caught up in oppor-
tunities and restraints imposed by the overall analytical approach that is
followed. They may believe that they can pursue a value-free approach to
their goals, or they may assume that any announced policy must be value
oriented. They may believe that the time frame to which they must be at-
tentive is the past and present. Or, they may assume that their horizon must
encompass the future, as well as the past and present. They may believe
that their missions will be accomplished through a description of salient
events and considerations. Or, they may acknowledge that their work would
be incomplete if they did not offer some value-laden prescriptive solutions.
Biases may give direction to outcomes. Again, societal influences, like
Cardozo's brooding omnipresence in the sky, will affect the perimeters
of the decisional process and the value-free or value-laden outcomes. The
decision makers may possess limited horizons and be content with at-
tempting to serve the national interest. Or, they may perceive the wider
and all-encompassing needs of mankind and thereby seek to serve the
interests of the world community. Problems can be viewed as limited or
discrete. On the other hand, the interrelationship of issues may be visu-
alized and responses directed to them. The meaning and role of power
can be variously understood. American and Soviet leaders do not conceive
of power merely in the sense that it is available for military or other forms
of overt coercion. Views may also differ on the context for and the amount
101. Id. at 53.
102. Id. at 66.
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of coercive power that may be applied unilaterally or collectively within
the nation-state system. And, as the quotation from Secretary-General
Perez de Cuellar at the outset demonstrated, it is by no means safe to
assume that human survival is assured. Alternatively, it may be at risk.
All of these considerations, and more, will influence the search for stra-
tegic stability among the superpowers.
Background events and considerations leading to the November 1985
Summit and the October 1986 mini-summit can be barely mentioned.
Fascinating as is the subject of the personalities of American and Russian
leaders, and the political constituencies to which they owe their official
status, to these only passing reference can be made. Briefly, different
types of leaders and different constraints upon their respective powers
derive from different forms of government. One leader operates under a
constitution that prescribes a separation of powers between executive,
legislative, and judicial branches; the other operates along monolithically
authoritarian lines. Aside from the personal qualities of such political
figures, the process whereby authority is transferred from one leader to
another must be carefully weighed in drawing conclusions regarding the
durability of avowed policies.
VI. The Search for Acceptable Negotiating Strategies
The positions taken by the United States and the Soviet Union since
1978 in their searches for acceptable security bases have reflected much
intransigence. The result has been a change of outlook as to the appro-
priate forum for the negotiations. New initiatives as to the manner in
which the space-based ASATs and the ballistic missile issues should be
kept separate or joined together have also resulted. In both instances the
two superpowers have abandoned earlier approaches and have since Jan-
uary of 1985 determined to make use of bilateral negotiations in which
three subjects are to be discussed concurrently, with their interrelationship
being taken into account. These three areas are space weapons, strategic
nuclear arms, and intermediate range nuclear arms.
Between 1978 and 1985 the two countries found it difficult to identify
a forum best suited to their negotiations. Between 1978 and 1979 they
were in agreement that they should engage in bilateral ASAT negotiations.
Between 1981 and 1982 both states supported the use of the Conference
of the Committee on Disarmament as the forum for general disarmament
discussions. In 1983 the Soviet Union proposed that COPUOS should be
used as the forum for negotiations relating to space weapons, but this
idea was not favored by the United States. In 1983 the Conference on
Disarmament, which had replaced the Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament, was the favored forum by the United States, and it was
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acceptable to the Soviet Union. Then, at the end of June 1984, both
countries appeared ready to engage in bilateral negotiations relating to
ASATs. This negotiation was aborted, however, when the Soviet Union
contended that the United States had attached preconditions to the Soviet
proposal by expressing a willingness to consider strategic and intermediate
range nuclear arms. In September 1984 bilateral discussions were held at
the meeting of the UN General Assembly and then in Washington. In
November 1984 the two countries announced they would meet in Geneva
on January 7 and 8, 1985, in order to work out arrangements for wide-
ranging substantive negotiations. This meeting led to the first of numerous
bilateral sessions in Geneva beginning on March 11, 1985, which in turn
set the stage for the November 1985 Geneva Summit in which the two
heads of State gave their blessings to the bilateral negotiations that had
begun in March. In short, bilateral negotiations have been preferred over
those conducted under the auspices of multinational international
organizations.
During the 1978-1985 period the superpowers also found it very difficult
to agree upon what issues they should give their attention to. They were
concerned with ASATs, outer space weapons, and nuclear ballistic mis-
siles including strategic nuclear arms and intermediate range nuclear
weapons. During 1978-1979 they gave their attention to ASATs. However,
in August of 1981 the Soviet Union presented the UN General Assembly
with a "Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons of
Any Kind in Outer Space." 103 The draft, which was not limited to ASATs,
and which treated the American space shuttle as an ASAT, was opposed
by the United States. Again, in August of 1983 the Soviet Union submitted
to the UN General Assembly a "Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the
Use of Force in Outer Space and from Outer Space Against the Earth." 
1 04
Again, this proposal was not limited to ASATs. It also was opposed by
the United States, since one of its articles appeared to authorize the
unilateral use of force in order to secure its implementation.
President Andropov followed these initiatives with a statement to vis-
iting United States Senators in August of 1983 that the two countries
should focus their attention exclusively on the barring of ASATs. President
Chernenko extended this approach on May 19, 1984, when he advanced
the view that all space weapons should be banned. And, as has been
previously indicated, the Geneva meeting of January 7 and 8, 1985, de-
termined that mutual negotiations should examine arms in space, inter-
mediate range nuclear weapons, and strategic nuclear weapons.
103. U.N. Doc. A/36/192*, Annex, at 1 (1981); U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/97, Annex (1982).
104. U.N. Doc. A/38/194, Annex, at 1 (1983).
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Thus, on the record both countries over time have changed their po-
sitions. The result has produced a much more highly focused area for
negotiations. They are to be bilateral. They are to deal with arms in space,
including ASATs, as well as intermediate range and strategic nuclear weap-
ons. Remaining in doubt is the consideration of the SDI in Geneva. The
Soviet Union wishes to bring this subject into the field of negotiations,
while the United States has taken the position that SDI is a unique subject
and should not be superimposed on those previously identified. An Amer-
ican SDI does not fit into the preferred Soviet plans for the future. Un-
doubtedly, the American initiative produced a more conciliatory outlook
on the part of the Soviet Union toward the United States at the end of
1985 based on the Soviet hope that the United States could be induced
to abandon any SDI plans beyond its 1986-1987 research stage. Failing
this outcome, the Soviet Union would undoubtedly readopt its earlier,
and perhaps basic, Cold War posture.
Thus, the joint concerns of the two countries, which were elevated as
a result of the development and testing of ASATs, and which were ex-
acerbated by failed negotiations dealing with intermediate range and stra-
tegic nuclear weapons, and which were enhanced by the U.S. SDI initi-
ative, led to new bilateral negotiations in Geneva in March of 1985, to
the Geneva Summit in November of 1985, and to the October 1986 mini-
summit. Underlying these last meetings, and upon which their ultimate
success will depend, is the creation of a new sense of trust between the
two countries.
In their respective 1986 New Year's messages, broadcast to the people
of the other country for the first time, President Reagan and General
Secretary Gorbachev called for the reduction of the suspicions and mis-
trusts that have plagued the relations of the two countries. Aside from
the respective messages of hope stressed by both leaders, the need, re-
mains as President Reagan said, "to reduce the massive nuclear arsenals
on both sides."' 1 5 In the same view, the Soviet Leader said: "[i]t is a
reality of today's world that it is senseless to seek greater security for
oneself through new types of weapons. At present, every step in the arms
race increases the danger and the risk for both sides and for all human-
kind."' 1 6 Thus, while President Reagan emphasized the importance of
using the Geneva negotiations for the purpose of obtaining agreements
"on the principle of 50% reductions in offensive nuclear arms and an
interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear weapons," °10 7 Mr. Gor-
bachev identified his goal as one "of cutting back nuclear arsenals and
105. L.A. Times, Jan. 2, 1986, Part I, at 16.
106. Id. at 17.
107. Id. at 16.
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keeping outer space peaceful." 108 These objectives fit into the theme
promulgated at the 1985 Summit, namely, the making of a new and fresh
start in the relations of the two states with the goal of reducing their areas
of suspicion and mistrust.
VII. On Drafting of International Arms
Control and Disarmament Agreements
In President Reagan's 1986 New Year's message to the people of the
Soviet Union he made specific reference to seeking agreements respecting
nuclear arms and systems. He also noted the signing of a new agreement
whereby exchanges of artists and academicians might be facilitated. Mr.
Gorbachev did not actually use the word "agreement" in his message.
In a more ambiguous fashion he expressed the hope that constructive and
peaceful plans would enable the Geneva negotiations to be successful and
that the common quest of the two countries for peace would yield tangible
results. He expressed the hope that common outlooks would produce a
new "reality." 109
Law and lawyers are bound to play a central role in advancing such
negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion. In the process the international
lawyer's expertise in the drafting of international agreements will be of
vital importance. In order to be effective the lawyer's political judgments,
based on a wide-ranging accumulation of facts and insights, must be such
as can be relied on. In arms control and disarmament negotiations the
United States has benefited from the inclusion of lawyers on the negoti-
ating team. 110
International lawyers, like other lawyers, seek to conserve the con-
structive, socially oriented traditions that have come down to them
throughout history. The intellectual rigor of the trained lawyer and his
pragmatic sense of what can actually be realized in practice can serve to
lubricate the opposing positions of adversaries. International lawyers fre-
quently point out alternatives to fixed positions in order to facilitate the
realization of adequate accommodations. In their search for valid out-
comes, they often counsel restraint. The overall policy process can benefit
from the lawyer's identification of valid bargains and subsequent crafts-
manship in drafting the agreements.
International agreements, in the sense of a formal international treaty,
can be useful in two different situations. First, they can reduce to written
form the substantive content of common international practices that have
108. Id. at 17.
109. Id. at 17.
110. McNeill, supra note 12, at 52-67.
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already worked their way into the general principles of customary inter-
national law. Second, such formal agreements can provide specialized
contractual relationships between the parties on subjects, including new
subjects, that do not derive their authority from preexisting customary
international law. A bilateral arms control and disarmament agreement
would fall into the second category.
Before an international agreement of the second category, dealing with
an issue as sensitive and important as that of arms control and disar-
mament, could be entered into prudently, being affected as it is by the
quest for strategic stability, certain basic assurances must be met. Existing
international space law permits states to engage in unlimited space re-
connaissance activities, even when carried out by military personnel using
military equipment. These activities serve as a stabilizing influence in the
relationships of the superpowers. Reconnaissance by satellites provides
information about the conduct of a potential adversary. This serves to
discourage offensive conduct, particularly when the potential adversary
knows that such information about itself has been and is being acquired
on a meticulous and regular basis. Such gathering of information for de-
fensive use can be characterized as a peaceful rather than an offensive
use of the space environment. The continual acquisition of information
about a potential adversary, particularly when it is known that such con-
duct is being reciprocated, produces counsels of caution. It is a stabilizing
and peaceful rather than a destabilizing and aggressive course of conduct.
The importance of this reasoning led to the incorporation into the 1972
ABM Treaty and the accompanying Interim Agreement of the right to
employ "national technical means of verification." t' The result was in-
clusion in the 1979 Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
of mutual promises "not to use deliberate concealment measures which
impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the
provisions of this Treaty." 112
111. 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503. Article XII of the 1972 Treaty and Article V of
the Interim Agreement. On verification see, e.g., VERIFICATION AND ARMs CONTROL (Potter
ed. 1985).
112. Article XV of the unratified and apparently suspended Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms, signed at Vienna on June 18, 1979. Arms Control and Disarmament Agree-
ments, Texts and Histories of Negotiations, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
266 (1982). To this Article were attached a First and a Second Agreed Statement and a First
and a Second Common Understanding. These confirm the duties of the parties not to employ
deliberate concealment measures to impede verification by national means of compliance
with the provisions of the agreement. General conformity to this treaty promise has been
cited in support of the view that all arms control commitments need not be formalized. See
Adelman, Arms Control with and Without Agreements, 63 FOREIGN AFF. 240 (Winter 1984/
1985).
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A mutual concern for confidence-building measures offers encourage-
ment that international agreements will be complied with. This concept
has particular application to the fair and equitable verification of confor-
mity to treaty promises. Verification, if it is to meet legitimate concerns
respecting national security, must be an open and a routine event. Mo-
tivations founded on considerations of secrecy do not allow for the build-
ing of mutual confidence. States have found it possible to accept mutually
controlled verification practices in a number of relatively minor and non-
security oriented situations. When the threat of a nuclear holocaust looms
as a possibility, the need for all-encompassing verification is absolute.
Out of such open and unrestricted practices the condition of confidence
will arise.
The United States has raised the verification issue with the Soviet Union
in connection with ASAT discussions. The U.S. has expressed its desire
to "try to identify measures that would ban or limit specific weapons
systems, while meeting our verification concerns." ' 113 According to Sec-
retary of State George Shultz, verification is central to an agreement
concerning ASATs. In his words: "Experience has shown that agreements
lacking such provisions become a source of tension and mistrust, rather
than reinforcing the prospects for peace."'" 4 Because of the general ac-
ceptance of the importance of verification, it unquestionably will be a
major consideration in all future arms control and disarmament negotia-
tions and formal agreements.
The search for confidence in the motivations and practices of a potential
adversary raises the issue of the form that future agreements might take.
Many hold the view that a formal written agreement should not be entered
into until after practical experience has demonstrated the value and the
enforceability of the undertaking. Thus, it has been suggested it would
be wise to gain experience with a given pattern of strategic and tactical
behavior for a period long enough to demonstrate that both parties are
mutually confident that they can enter into a formalized arms control and
disarmament agreement. If, over time, a stabilized situation can be per-
ceived as being mutually beneficial, then the components of such behavior
tend to assure the success of the provisions of a formal written agreement.
Its terms would simply encompass and reflect the previously established
pattern of acceptable conduct.
Arms control and disarmament negotiations can be rendered more plau-
sible if they are accompanied by confidence-building measures by the
113. U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Realism and Responsibility: The U.S.
Approach to Arms Control, Current Policy No. 5770, at 4 (1984).
114. Id. at 2. He also observed: "The President's recent findings of Soviet violations or
probable violations of a number of arms control obligations underlies that effective verifi-
cation is essential." Id.
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parties, parties who have at the outset found themselves in an adversarial
relationship. Confidence can be engendered through a mutual commitment
to closely guarded diplomatic negotiations. The avoidance of unilaterally
promulgated preconditions as an element in the bargaining process is a crit-
ical guide to the seriousness of such negotiations. In recent years the su-
perpowers have been prone to engage in public maneuver for self-serving
purposes. The accompanying posturing, with the attendant criticism by the
other side, has not constructively served the negotiating process.
If the foregoing conditions can be met, namely, the acceptance of a
formal written agreement only after its terms have been previously ho-
nored in practice by the prospective parties, and if the final drafting
negotiations can take place in a calm and private manner, then the chances
for a meaningful outcome can be much enhanced. Of course, in the se-
lection of treaty terms great caution would necessarily be exercised. The
employment of highly specific terminology would inhibit typical problems
respecting the interpretation of the agreement. Careful drafting can min-
imize claims that implicit assurances were contained in the formal
agreement.
In sum, little advantage is to be gained when parties to arms control
and disarmament agreements rush into the formulation of a formal agree-
ment at a time when the full nature of the respective accommodations
has not been ascertained, and when the overall benefits to be derived
from a condition of strategic stability have not been identified. This is
particularly true when important new discoveries are occurring all the
time in science and technology. Every new ramification of the electronic
age imposes uncertain conditions in an almost unknowable manner on
the future capabilities of space objects and their component parts. None-
theless, the very dynamism of science and technology makes the need to
comprehend the value of strategic stability all the more critical.
VIII. The International Lawyer
and the Implementation of Agreements
The international lawyer, after having taken into account the interests,
values, wants, and needs of his client, and with a substantial concern for
the well-being of all of the members of the global community, has a major
interest in obtaining compliance with the product of his draftsmanship.
To what influences and resources may he turn to secure the implemen-
tation of the agreement?
From a purely analytical perspective, the substance of international law
and implementing processes are two quite separate things. However, if
the concept of the world rule of law is to have any significant meaning,
the two must be linked together.
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Substantial reasons exist for conformity to all law, including the terms
of formal, and even informal, international agreements and undertakings.
First, conventional wisdom suggests that conformity to law reduces ten-
sions and instabilities. Through the use of law and legal systems there is
a prospect for the presence of a minimum, and in some instances more
than a minimum, amount of world order.
Second, when law and legal processes exist and commend themselves
to statesmen, the prospect exists for planning for an attainable future. A
certain amount of stability results from the presence of predictability and
consistency.
Third, a multiplicity of sanctions may become operative in the event
of unacceptable departures from recognized norms of behavior. These
sanctions range all the way from highly coercive physical conduct, such
as the massive destruction of persons and property in time of armed
conflict, to economic constraints, and to diplomatic expressions of
displeasure.
Fourth, the possibility that sanctions may be imposed on a country that
does not conform its conduct to international law generally, and to its
treaty obligations in particular, may produce numerous anxieties for a
violator. States, like individuals, fear the label of "law-breaker." Such
concerns can take a variety of forms beyond fear of physical and economic
detriment. These include concerns over loss of prestige, esteem, and the
sense of "standing high" in the opinion of the world community. 115
Fifth, conformity to law cannot be separated from moral considerations.
Although it is frequently suggested that states are governed wholly by a
concern for national interest, national leaders are not immune to moral
considerations. To the extent they feel a moral need to conform to the
expectations of the law, they experience a sense of moral guilt in the event
of noncompliance. The theme that there is a "higher duty" to conform
to law can also be attributed to ethical and religious precepts.
While it may be convenient, and superficially persuasive, to rely on the
presence of police, prosecutors, courts, prisons, and the entire physical
apparatus of the law enforcement process to justify conformity to law,
there is more to it than that. For many individuals, and for many countries,
115. Root, The Sanctions of International Law, 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SO-
CIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (1908). In his frequently quoted observations, Root
stated:
There is an indefinite and almost mysterious influence exercised by the general opinion
of the world regarding the nation's character and conduct. The greatest and strongest
governments recognize this influence and act with reference to it. They dread the moral
isolation created by general adverse opinion and the unfriendly feeling that accompanies
it, and they desire the general approval and kindly feeling that goes with it.
Obviously, there are countries today which have little concern for Root's premises.
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compliance is not founded solely on the prospect of punitive sanctions.
The belief that there is "a right thing to do" will also have influence.
Sixth, although the international legal principle of national sovereignty
may encourage a drive toward and even the consummation of national
interests, varying assumptions have emerged from the sovereignty prin-
ciple. One is that a state has an enormous latitude in pursuing self-centered
objectives. Another is that in modern times, a state's sovereign options
are subject to substantial constraints. If the latter is the case, and if the
constraints are founded on principles of general international law, as well
as on factors external to the state, which impose on it the mandate of
prudent conduct, then there may not be many alternatives to law com-
pliance. Conformity to the law in these circumstances may be the rule
rather than the exception. The presence of identifiable norms of law will,
per se, contribute to compliance with it.
Lastly, the vitality of law, and a high measure of conformity to it, will
depend on a realization that common benefits and mutual advantages do
result from the presence of established legal principles, rules, and stan-
dards, as well as adequate lawmaking and law-enforcing processes. Det-
riment or loss of advantage can befall a deviating state. Common benefits
can flow to those countries that conform their conduct to the principled
expectations of the world community. Order rather than chaos is expected
to result from a rational assessment of benefits and detriments. This was
well explained by J. L. Brierly, as follows:
The ultimate explanation of the binding force of all law is that man, whether
he is a single individual or whether he is associated with other men in a State,
is constrained, insofar as he is a reasonable being, to believe that order and not
chaos is the governing principle of the world in which he has to live."16
From this brief summary it can be concluded that compliance with
international law depends on considerations having a mixed moral, so-
cial, political, and utilitarian character. In an increasingly interdependent
world legal norms, particularly where the law institution is regarded as
legitimate, have the function of serving the needs of world order. This
is particularly true in the relations of the superpowers as they adjust
their thinking to the overwhelmingly critical issues of nuclear arms
control and disarmament, both on the earth and in the far reaches of
outer space.
because the threat of a nuclear holocaust has such an ultimate impact on
common human interests, values, wants, and needs, it is essential that
relevant community-serving legal principles and rules be identified and
measures be taken to achieve conformity with them. Specifically there is
116. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 56 (6th ed. 1963).
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the need for the careful and progressive evolution of international expec-
tations and formal international agreements so that arms control and dis-
armament may fall under a valid international legal regime. Reasons of
the kind that have been identified should offer some sense of confidence
in the formulation of constraints designed to benefit those who seek stra-
tegic stability in a nuclear world inhabited by peoples and governments
possessing asymmetrical outlooks.
IX. Conclusion
In the real world, countries, as with individuals, share dissimilarities
as well as similarities. Their habits drive them apart; an overriding sense
of common interests, values, wants, and needs bring them together.
A country's habit, conditioned by the institution of statehood, and
coupled with distrust of the perceived motivations and actions of others,
can carry with it the conviction that statehood allows for an unlimited
freedom of choice. Concerns for national survival fuel the belief that major
dissimilarities are endemic to the present system of world order. None-
theless, all countries share common perspectives as to the importance of
national security, territorial integrity, and sovereign equality. They sup-
port the importance of strategic stability. They also profess to be con-
cerned for the general well-being, however defined, of their populations.
In the cauldron of their dissimilarities and similarities they are confronted
by a welter of nationally inspired sovereign claims to wide-ranging free-
dom of choice and action. They must also confront the countervailing
demands, which result from the practical view that national freedom of
action is not and cannot be unrestricted.
Thus, for practical, if not for ideological reasons, the leaders of states
have endeavored to maximize their particular national interests. This, it
is apparent, depends on and flows from their appreciation of the fact that
there must be mutual acceptances of and supports for basic common
interests. Thus, they engage in dialogues in different institutional settings.
These dialogues enable national leaders to search for and receive some
appreciation for the existence of fundamental interests, values, wants,
and needs. Even the superpowers, with their vast asymmetries, cannot
separate themselves from the fact that self-interest, even in a nationally
oriented world, requires some accommodation between opposing out-
looks. In short, in a world in which all states seek to advance nationally
inspired goals they must also recognize and be guided by considerations
allowing for the advancement of common interests.
As the United States and the Soviet Union conduct an inventory of
their national goals and make an assessment of their common interests,
they are obliged to conclude that because of their respective military
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capabilities neither can win a war against the other. The costs would be
disproportionate to any possible gain. Neither, however, is able to dictate
an acceptable world order built entirely on lines wholly satisfactory to it.
In this state of affairs reciprocal necessities ordain that they pay careful
heed to benefits resulting from a condition of relative, but nonetheless,
adequate strategic stability. This means that they are ultimately consigned
to a condition where they cannot aspire to the winning of a perfect war
or the gaining of a perfect peace. As Henry A. Kissinger has recently
noted, "the cataclysmic nature of nuclear war imposes the necessity of
coexistence," that is, a condition of live and let live. 117 In this condition,
durability and steadiness of purpose are commendable virtues.
In these circumstances international law and the insights of international
lawyers can serve the cause of humankind by optimizing the condition of
strategic stability. After all, such stability is founded on mutual self-interest,
which, as I have endeavored to demonstrate, is the ultimate foundation
upon which the edifice of civilized society, as well as international law,
is based.
117. L.A. Times, Dec. 15, 1985, Part V, at 1.
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